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Introduction
Over the last few decades, institutions have been the subject of great 
attention among economists and economic historians. Diﬀerent eco-
nomic developments in countries with quite similar resource and 
technology assets have led scholars to investigate more deeply the role 
and eﬀects of institutional, political and social elements in the 
economic system. Research has normally focused on the guarantee 
of property rights, the »eﬃciency« of the economic system, the re-
distribution of resources among groups, as well as the processes of 
inclusion in and exclusion from the use of resources.2
This debate has encouraged historical investigations in many areas 
of economic history, reviving earlier debates on agricultural develop-
ment, guilds and technological innovation, the role of the state in 
manufacturing and proto-industries, the commercial revolution and 
early-modern merchant networks.3 As far as the role of the state in 
1 Although the article is a joint reﬂection, the ﬁrst chapter was written by 
Paola Lanaro, the second by Andrea Caracausi and the third by Giovanni Favero.
2 D C. N, Institutions, Institutional change and Economic Perform-
ance, Cambridge 1990; A G, Institutions and the Path to the Modern 
Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge 2006; S O, State 
Corporatism and Proto-Industry. The Württemberg Black Forest 1580–1797, Cam-
bridge 1997; D A and J A. R, Why Nations Fail: The 
Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, London 2012.
3 See, for instance: D C. N and R P T, The Rise of 
the Western World: A New Economic History, Cambridge 1973; S R. E
and M P (ed.), Guilds, Innovation, and the European Economy, 
manufacturing and proto-industries is concerned, the debate on the 
role of state economic policies during the early modern age was 
characterised by two distinct views. Somehow conﬁrming the opin-
ion on the matter of the »physiocrats« and classical economists, some 
authors have reinterpreted mercantilism as a sanction granted by the 
state (through monopolies designed to increase tax revenues) to the 
rent positions of some very inﬂuential groups. Recently, the success of 
these policies has been linked to the emergence of very diﬀerent 
institutional structures in each national context.4
Other authors have instead investigated the broader character of 
the mercantilist grants (i. e. the privileges). As some studies on north-
western European manufacturing claim, these grants were based on 
the very pragmatic character of mercantilist policies. Further studies 
on southern and central Europe have indeed emphasized two aspects. 
First, privileges do not always mean monopoly. Secondly, they had a 
positive role in promoting technological innovations inside the guild 
systems and in protecting the inventors.5 Other scholars have argued 
that »privileges« must be inserted in the legal and institutional 
context of the ancien régime. Mercantilist policies can be considered 
in this perspective as the tool to build an institutional system 
protecting intellectual property rights in the manufacturing sector.6
States aim to limit the number of producers, establishing monopo-
lies, but also by means of tax exemptions and constraints on the 
1400–1800, Cambridge 2008; S O, Institutions and European Trade 
merchant guilds, 1000–1800, Cambridge 2011. See also the debate in F 
T, The familiarity of strangers: the Sephardic diaspora, Livorno and cross-
cultural trade in the early modern period, New Haven / London 2009, Introduction 
and Chapter 6.
4 R E and R T, Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking 
Society: Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective, College station (Texas) 1981; 
, Politicized Economies: Monarchy, Monopoly, and Mercantilism, College 
Station (Texas) 1997.
5 L M, The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice, Baltimore / London 
2000; L H-P, L’invention technique au siècle des Lumières, Paris 
2000; C B, Guilds, Patents, and the Circulation of Technical Knowl-
edge: Northern Italy during the Early Modern Age, in: Technology and Culture 45 
(2004), pp. 569–589.
6 C B, Between mercantilism and market: privileges for inven-
tion in early modern Europe, in: Journal of Institutional Economics 2 (2006), 
pp. 319–338.
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circulation of labour. Their main purpose was to build a market that 
could guarantee the quality and quantity of the output. The function 
of privileges depends on the more general economic policy of the 
time, which was strictly connected to a variable institutional and 
economic context.
This chapter as a whole aims to provide some preliminary insight 
into the economic role of privileges in the early-modern Republic of 
Venice with a focus on markets and manufactures. Recent historiog-
raphy has largely confuted the supposed decline of the urban eco-
nomy since the seventeenth century. Processes of reconversion and 
adaptation to the new global challenges between the seventeenth and 
the eighteenth centuries allowed the Republic to maintain an 
important position in the Euro-Mediterranean scenario right up 
until the end of the ancien régime.7 In order to show how the ruling 
class was able to adapt its policy towards markets and manufactures 
in these changing situations, the ﬁrst of the following sections will 
start from an analysis of the structure of fairs and markets on the 
Venetian Mainland, especially aer the conquest of the Terraferma in 
the ﬁeenth century. The second section analyses the role of com-
mercial privileges, focusing mainly on long-distance trade between 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Aer a general 
overview of Venetian trade in this period, which will be useful to 
underline the general reconﬁguration of trade structure, the focus 
will be both on the individual and collective privileges granted to 
foreign merchants or communities as well as on the exemptions 
granted to single products or to a group of products. The aim of these 
privileges was twofold. On the one hand, they ensured that the State 
had control over tax revenues, duties, monopolies and commercial 
routes. On the other hand, and paradoxically, they sustained market 
integration at a global level, by allowing other members to enter a 
particular segment of trade, whilst not precluding the general mono-
poly accorded to the Venetian State. The ﬁnal section will discuss the 
impact of manufacturing privileges on the entrepreneurial organiza-
tion of production, using the results of some case studies as a starting 
point to put forward more general hypotheses.
7 See especially P L (ed.), At the centre of the old world: trade and 
manufacturing in Venice and the Venetian mainland, 1400–1800, Toronto 2006.
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nnn2) The Venetian Colonies in the Mediterranean Sea (Stato da Mar)
nnn3) The Venetian Territory in Italy (Stato da Terra)
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I. Fairs and markets in the Venetian Republic considered
as a privileged space
This section aims to summarize on the one hand the most recent 
historiographical ﬁndings relating to the role of economic privileges 
granted to local communities and to subject cities in the Venetian 
political economy; on the other to build a more complex approach to 
the argument. The particular constitution of the Republic and the 
peculiar integration (or lack of integration) with the Mainland (the 
Terraferma) lends a certain uniqueness to the political economy of the 
State; for that reason, studying the Republic can provide a new 
discussion of the frequently-studied issues concerning the idea of 
mercantilism. This section deals with the role of the economic 
privileges connected to fairs in the Venetian region. In particular, it 
attempts to understand the role of fairs in the economic strategy of 
the Venetian elite between the ﬁeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
analyse the privileges as supporters of those strategies.8 It is well 
known that from a political point of view the conquest by Venice of 
the mainland did not provoke an integration of the elites of the 
Mainland (the elites of Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Treviso, Bergamo, 
Brescia, Crema were usually noblemen linked to the old Medieval 
seigniorial regimes, such as the Scaligeri, Carraresi, Visconti, etc.). The 
choice not to integrate these elites was conﬁrmed up to the end of the 
Republic, and therefore the Venetian elite governed alone the 
Venetian state, whilst the noblemen of the Mainland were engaged 
only in the administrative aﬀairs of their respective cities. Never-
theless, a strong debate about this argument was started during the 
8 This section is based on P L, I rapporti commerciali tra Verona e 
la Marca Anconetana tra basso medioevo ed età moderna, in: Studi Storici Luigi 
Simeoni XLV (1995), pp. 9–25; , I mercati nella Repubblica veneta. Economie 
cittadine e stato territoriale (secoli XV–XVIII), Venedig 1999; , Periferie senza 
centro. Reti ﬁeristiche nello spazio geograﬁco della terraferma veneta in età 
moderna, in: La pratica dello scambio. Sistemi di ﬁere, mercanti e città in Europa 
(1400–1700), ed. by P L, Venedig 2003, pp. 21–51; , Economic 
Space and Urban Policies. Fairs and Markets in the Italy of the Early Modern 
Age, in: Journal of Urban History 30–1 (2003), pp. 37–49. See also the article 
written by Christof Jeggle concerning Bolzano fairs. In general the text of 
reference for comparative analysis is S R. E, Freedom and growth. The 
rise of states and markets in Europe, 1300–1750, London / New York 2000.
370 Andrea Caracausi, Giovanni Favero, Paola Lanaro
eighteenth century with the publication of the »Consiglio politico 
alla Repubblica veneta« written by the Veronese Scipione Maﬀei, a 
well-known European intellectual of the time.
It is clear that the behaviour of the Mainland elites was not homo-
geneous. The proximity of the cities to Venice, the diﬀerent political 
role developed by these elites inside a diﬀerent political organization 
before the Venetian dominion and the evolution in the peninsula of 
the seigniorial regime towards the organization of the regional state 
during the ﬁeenth century gave a diﬀerent power and a diﬀerent 
force to the old urban patrician elite.
The elite governing the city of Verona was the strongest and 
therefore had greater bargaining power than, for example, the elite 
governing Vicenza. As frequently happened in the north and in the 
centre of the peninsula, these elites were represented by merchants 
and merchant-entrepreneurs, whose wealth could inﬂuence the 
choices of the Venetian ruling class.
The monopoly of political power was counterbalanced by a certain 
number of privileges, above all of an economic nature. Apart from 
the primacy of maritime commerce, which was always the exclusive 
province of the »Venetian« merchants, as explained by the historian 
Alberto Tenenti, Venice was always linked to the sea despite the 
conquest of the mainland,9 the Venetian elite was very generous in 
giving autonomy to the merchants of the Terraferma. This strategy 
favoured overland trade. Both within and outside the boundaries of 
the Republic, the networks of merchants (Venetians, but also »Ital-
ians« and non-Italians: Greeks, Germans, Turks or merchants from 
Eastern Europe) beneﬁted from the Venetian economic attitude 
which gave them the greatest freedom as the Venetian elite was 
interested essentially in tax revenues. The strong defence of the 
monopoly over maritime trade for the members of the Venetian elite 
and, above all, for the cives originari, had as consequence a traditional 
laissez-faire culture towards the merchants of the »Mainland« who, 
though excluded from international maritime trade, were favoured 
9 A T, Il senso del mare, in: Storia di Venezia. Dalle origini alla 
caduta della Serenissima, vol XII, Il mare, ed. by A T and U T, 
Rom 1991.
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with reference to overland trade simply through the ambiguous 
interplay of privileges.
The right of the cittadini originari who had the monopoly of 
maritime trade in the Levantine regions was never under discussion 
for the entire duration of the Republic. However, aer the conquest 
of the Mainland, the merchants of the conquered cities had the right 
to trade in Venice (de mercari Venetiis) as cives de intus tantum: this 
privilege gave a sort of equilibrium to the social and economic dy-
namics of the Venetian world.10 Nevertheless, the Venetian elite was 
constituted only and always by the patrician families of Venice, who 
were deﬁned as such as a result of a long process started at the end of 
the thirteenth century and closed in the fourteenth century. A further 
enlargement of the elite was possible only in the ﬁrst half of the 
seventeenth century during the war of Candia, when Venice started 
selling the title of patrizio Veneto (Venetian patrician) for 100,000 
ducats in order to raise the necessary money for organizing ﬂeet and 
armies. This title was indeed acquired by the rich families of the 
Mainland elites or merchants; however, only in a few cases were the 
new patricians considered, formally and informally, full members of 
the ruling class.
With the conquest of the Mainland, it may be supposed that the 
Venetian ruling class considered it important and necessary to grant a 
certain number of privileges concerning overland commerce to the 
mainland merchants, the core of the elite of the conquered cities.
The senso del mare (sense of the sea), as illustrated by Alberto 
Tenenti, is an expression of the peculiarity of Renaissance Venice to 
be the only state in the peninsula and perhaps on the continent to 
govern a commercial empire linked to the maritime trade of that 
time.11 This makes Venice a unique example in the history of the pre-
10 R M, Immigrazione e cittadinanza nella Venezia medievale, 
Venedig / Rom 2010; A B, Identité, mariage, mobilité sociale. Citoy-
ennes et citoyens à Venise au XVIe siècle, Rom 2001; , »Per cittadini 
metterete …« La stratiﬁcazione della società veneziana cinquecentesca tra norma 
giuridica e riconoscimento sociale, in: Quaderni Storici XXXII (1995), 
pp. 359–383; see also in general P L, Corporations et confréries: les 
étrangers et le marché du travail à Venise (XVe–XVIIIe siècles), in: Histoire 
Urbaine 21 (2008), pp. 31–49. 
11 A T, Venezia e il senso del mare: storia di un prisma culturale dal 
XIII al XVIII secolo, Neapel 1999.
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modern states of the Italian peninsula and helps us to understand the 
particular form of mercantilism followed by the Venetian merchants 
also with reference to diﬀerent political arenas: the capital, Venice, at 
the centre of the system of commercial networks; and the mainland, 
whose attracting force became increasingly important aer the 
sixteenth century.
With the slow but signiﬁcant loss of the maritime empire and the 
scaling-down of the dominion of the grande mercatura (the maritime 
commerce with the Near and Far East) in the international landscape 
– as will be discussed in detail below – and in the eﬀort not to touch 
the privileges of the elite and of the cittadini originari, the economic 
integration of the conquered area in the north of Italy, never really 
attained, was pursued also by granting mercantile privileges to the 
diﬀerent merchant elites, who governed the conquered Venetian and 
Lombard cities. The grant of privileges usually concerned the eco-
nomic activities, in particular production and commerce, and in 
general it aﬃrmed the principle that, for ﬁscal reasons, both the 
goods coming into and the goods going out of the Venetian Republic 
should pass through the market of Rialto. Obviously, not every city 
obtained the grant of the same privileges. The patrician elite of Padua, 
for instance, showed in diﬀerent moments of its history its opposition 
to the Venetian dominion and was ultimately to be dramatically 
cancelled as a political group. As a consequence, it could not obtain 
anything in the political negotiations preceding the military occupa-
tion in 1405. Other cities, in particular Verona and Brescia, even if 
under the siege of the victorious Venetian troops, obtained instead 
signiﬁcant economic privileges, such as a derogation to the ancient 
and never forgotten rule of the comune veneciarum, which placed the 
Rialto market at the core of the Venetian trade system. The rich and 
strong Veronese elite under the dominion of the Scaligeri had indeed 
experienced with success the role of the ruling class of an independ-
ent state whose boundaries arrived in the fourteenth century with 
Cangrande della Scala up to include the city of Lucca. The privileges 
Verona was granted aer the Venetian conquest were probably the 
largest and most important from an economic point of view, not only 
in terms of the political role of the Veronese families but probably 
also in terms of the importance of their status as merchants.
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In the example of Verona, the merchants were not only control-
ling international trade networks, even outside the Italian peninsula, 
but were at the same time merchant entrepreneurs. The textile 
industry had been well-developed in Verona since the thirteenth 
century: in particular, the wool trade and, aer the sixteenth century, 
the silk industry. Glass manufacturing, the leather industry and, later 
on, the production of knitted caps were also well-developed in 
Verona. The Veronese merchants were both merchants and mer-
chant-entrepreneurs and as such they could only partially go against 
the interests of the Venetian merchants, who were above all capitalist 
merchants in the commerce between East and West (the so-called 
commercio di transito). Only rarely were the important merchants of 
Venice merchant-entrepreneurs, even during the sixteenth century, 
when, according to Fernand Braudel, Venice was probably the most 
industrialized city of Europe.12 In this case the contribution of 
foreigners as workmen and artisans but also as merchant-entrepre-
neurs was essential, in particular the role of the merchant-entrepre-
neurs coming from the mainland was extraordinary; nevertheless, the 
role of the Venetian noblemen usually went no further than ﬁnanc-
ing the enterprises.13
The long history of Verona as a political capital in the peninsula 
and its important economic role as one of the most industrial cities in 
medieval Europe and also one of the most densely inhabited – Ve-
rona in 1300 was one of the ﬁrst ten cities with more than 15,000 
inhabitants in the centre and north of the peninsula – are the reasons 
that prompted Venice to accept the submission (dedizione) of the city 
in 1405, in order to avoid having to use assault troops. In this way, the 
Veronese elite was able to obtain two important commercial priv-
12 F B, Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe–
XVIIIe siècle, Paris 1979, vol. 3, Le temps du monde, p. 157; L, At the Centre 
of the Old World (n. 7), part 1, »Venice« (essays by Andrea Mozzato, Marcello 
Della Valentina, Francesca Trivellato, Walter Panciera); F C. L, Storia 
di Venezia, Turin 1978, pp. 355–371; G L, Storia economica di Venezia 
dall’XI al XVI secolo, Venedig 1995, pp. 163–214, but see also the »Introduction« 
by M B.
13 P L, Les investissements du patriciat de Venise et de la Terre 
Ferme aux XVe–XVIIIe siècles, in: Revue d’histoire moderne & contemporaine 59,1 
(2012), pp. 62–82.
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ileges that did not ﬁt the traditional Venetian idea of the centrality of 
Rialto.
The ﬁrst privilege – usually granted to every city on the mainland, 
even the less important ones – concerned the location of an annual 
fair, almost usually a ﬁera franca for one or two weeks, where 
merchandise could be bought and sold without paying custom duties 
(it should be said that there were no fairs in Venice, as the ﬁera della 
Sensa (Ascension) was not exactly a real fair, but rather an urban 
commercial meeting linked to a religious feast. The second privilege 
concerned only Verona and granted the local merchant elite the right 
to export their goods Sottovento without moving them through the 
Venetian port of Rialto (this exception concerned both raw materials 
and the goods coming in and going out of the Venetian Republic) 
choosing the way they preferred. For example, the Veronese mer-
chants for their trade with the centre and south of the peninsula 
preferred to follow the River Po to reach Ravenna, at that time a 
harbour of the Adriatic sea and then to reach the numerous little fairs 
of the centre-south of the Italian coast – such as Rimini, Senigallia, 
Recanati, Fano, Trani, etc. – where they could export their goods to 
the Near East and to the Muslim Mediterranean area. This privilege 
made it possible to avoid paying duty at Rialto and to choose non-
Venetian ships (»galere« o »navigli«) in Ravenna. Later on, at the 
moment of her submission in 1427, Brescia also obtained a similar 
privilege but this was limited only to the trade with the German area, 
presumably because of the importance of the trade in iron goods.
The ﬁrst grant was never questioned, and because of this the 
number of fairs, big and little, multiplied between the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, even though in the meantime in Western 
Europe their number had diminished impressively.
A few years later, however, the second grant became the subject of 
a dramatic dispute between the Venetian authorities, who tried to 
revoke it, and the Veronese elite, who fought to maintain it. The 
dispute ended in 1581, when Venice approved a new general law that 
abolished all the ancient particular privileges. Only the area of the 
boundary line could maintain the old privileges: in this way, the 
substantial expenses sustained by local authorities for controlling the 
boundaries were compensated by commercial exemptions. But, de-
spite the new general law, the merchants of the mainland (and not 
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only the Veronese merchants) went on to trade following the ancient 
route in order to escape the payment of custom duties at Rialto and 
this with the tacit assent of the Venetian authorities. Otherwise, the 
principal reason for granting privileges in the ﬁeenth century to the 
richest cities of the mainland was based either on the force of the 
older urban economies and of their hommes d’aﬀaires or on the desire 
not to depress with a high central ﬁscal pressure the activities of the 
manufacturers in the mainland who were at the same time a rich 
source of revenue for the Treasury. The archive sources explain clearly 
that the obligation to go through Rialto made the trade in the 
woollen goods produced in Verona more expensive, pushing the 
merchants to prefer to buy the woollen goods produced and sold at a 
lower price in Mantua.
The Venetian political choice not to depress the old urban eco-
nomies favoured the emergence inside the Venetian state of various 
partially autonomous districts that prevented the development of an 
economic region together with the constitution of the Venetian 
regional state.
Once again the uniqueness of Venice conﬁrms in its anomaly that 
mercantilism must be conceived as an ideal type rather than a well-
deﬁned economic policy.14
II. Commercial privileges and market policy
Whilst during the ﬁeenth and sixteenth centuries the Venetian elite 
reconﬁgured the structure of their privileged spaces within the 
Mainland, between the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, 
the ruling class started to reorganize its market policy towards 
international, mainly maritime, trade. At the end of the sixteenth 
century, Venice was still an important gateway between East and 
West, between Europe and Asia. However, during this period the 
Venetian economic structure changed rapidly, although old and new 
manufacturing sectors attracted foreign labour and investments, new 
commercial routes were opened and a diversiﬁcation of ﬁnancial 
14 See M I (ed.), Merkantilismus. Wiederaufnahme einer Debatte, 
München 2014.
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centres fostered a general reconﬁguration of the urban and regional 
economy. The consequences were important: whilst ancient manu-
factures, such as glass and silk, maintained their leading position, 
other sectors, such as the printing and wool industries, saw impres-
sive growth followed by dramatic decline.15 Furthermore, the foun-
dation of the »Banco della Piazza di Rialto« and, later, of the »Banco 
Giro«, which had the functions previously held by private banks, 
restored trust in ﬁnancial transactions.16 In the early years of the 
seventeenth century, many merchants appreciated Venice as the place 
where »it [is] possible ﬁnd money and pay the bills of exchange from 
any part of the world«.17
 The »revival« of the ancient silk routes sustained the import and 
export of Venetian manufactures and raw materials through the port 
of Rialto. Coming from the eastern Mediterranean gateways (Ales-
sandria, Aleppo, Izmir), products such as silk, cotton, diamonds and 
spices, were consumed in Venice or sent on to the German and 
Flemish lands; wine, oil, raisins, zambellotti (oriental clothes) were re-
exported to Spain, France, and England; wine and oil were also sent 
to South America in order to acquire cinnamon and sugar. On the 
other hand, Venice exported woollen and silk clothes, glass items and 
– last but not least – silver coins to the Near East. During the last three 
decades of the sixteenth century, the production of woollen goods 
sustained the export of Venetian manufactures. In order to produce 
these clothes, imports of Spanish wool and dying materials (grana), 
alum from Rome and oil from Apulia were necessary.
The commercial intermediation between East and West was 
ensured also through the trading routes through Antwerp, Cologne, 
Augsburg, Nuremberg and the routes through the Brenner or Tar-
15 D S, L’economia, in: Storia di Venezia, vol. VI, Dal Rinasci-
mento al Barocco, ed. by G C and P P, Rom 1994, 
pp. 651–712, p. 653; , Commerci e industrie a Venezia nel secolo XVII, 
Venedig / Rom 1961.
16 U T, Monete e banche nel secolo del ducato d’oro, in: Storia di 
Venezia, vol. V, Il Rinascimento. Società ed economia, ed. by G C and 
P P, Rom 1996, pp. 753–806; L P, La ﬁnanza pubblica, 
in: C and P, Storia di Venezia (n. 15), vol. VI, pp. 713–773. 
17 U T, Il Banco di Piazza di Rialto, prima banca pubblica veneziana, 
in: , Mercanti, navi e monete nel Cinquecento veneziano, Bologna 1981, p. 248.
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visio passes, as well as through the Mediterranean Sea, thanks to 
routes ensured by the galleys of Flanders. Aer the Battle of Lepanto, 
the favourable diplomatic situation and the relative demographic 
growth aer the plague of 1576 sustained for the period 1582–1602 
the increase in import-export revenues.18
 The commercial ﬂow had a great impact on local manufacturing, 
the aim of which was to counter-balance the payments to the foreign 
countries. Goods such as silk or cotton, which always came from 
other eastern Mediterranean ports (Syria, Turkey, Cyprus), stimulated 
the development of Venetian, but also of other European manufac-
tures. The growth of local manufacturing was so great that many 
scholars claim that Venice in the sixteenth century was an »industrial 
city«.19 Glass-making became world famous, thanks to a mix of 
luxury and non-luxury products. In turn, these items also stimulated 
the import of raw materials such as wood and ash.20 During the 
second half of the sixteenth century, the printing industry also grew 
rapidly. From a quantitative point of view, the number of ﬁrms 
increased and their commercial network included Italy and other 
parts of Europe.21 The growth in manufacturing involved many 
other sectors, such as soap and leather processing, but it was 
spectacular in the silk and wool industries. In the silk industry the 
merchants and merchant-manufacturers started to diversify their 
production to include a great variety of low- as well as high-quality 
clothes. This change engaged the local population in the various 
stages of production both within and outside the guild system. On 
the Mainland, mulberry cultivation and spinning increased rapidly.22
18 D S, Commerci e industrie a Venezia nel secolo XVII, Rom 1961, 
pp. 2–16.
19 U T, Venezia nel Cinquecento: una città industriale?, in: Crisi e 
rinnovamenti nell’autunno del Rinascimento a Venezia, ed. by V B and 
C O, Florenz 1991, pp. 61–83, pp. 70–71.
20 S, L’economia (n. 15), p. 653.
21 I M, »Mondo del libro« e decadenza a Venezia (1570–1730), in: 
Quaderni Storici LXXII (1989), pp. 743–786; A T, Luc’Antonio 
Giunti il giovane, stampatore e mercante, in: Studi in onore di Armando Sapori, 
vol. II, Mailand 1957, pp. 1021–1060.
22 L M, The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice, Baltimore / London 
2000; E D, L’»anima della città«. L’industria tessile a Verona e Vicenza 
(1400–1550), Mailand 2001; F V, Seta ﬁne e panni grossi. 
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The wool industry’s production rose from 10,000 to 24,000 pieces 
annually. The increase in the wool industry is interesting because of 
the comparison with other Italian cities. While many Italian urban 
economies reconverted their production from wool to silk, in Venice 
some processes of imitation and innovation allowed local drapers to 
compete with the emerging North-Western manufacturers. This 
strategy was based on simple »new light draperies«, called saglie or 
rascie, with the use of high- and low-quality Spanish wools and grana 
(garnet) for the red colour.23
 The increase in maritime trade, the growth of ancient and new 
manufacturing sectors, the intensiﬁcation of banking and insurance 
activities involved a very heterogeneous mercantile group. Whereas 
the Venetian merchant class shied generally from trade to agricul-
ture and ﬁnancial investments,24 foreign groups played an important 
role. Recent studies have underlined the key role of some foreign 
communities (Portuguese, Jews, Flemish, Dutch, English as well as 
Italians from Genoa, Florence and Milan) and of merchants from the 
Mainland (the Veneti) in connecting the Eastern Mediterranean ports 
to the North Sea.25
 This commercial system (i. e. the import/export trade between 
East and West) was closely interconnected. However, the Venetian – 
traditionally mercantilist – trade policies divided the two areas into 
Ponentine (»western«) and Levantine (»eastern«) routes, excluding 
foreign and non-Venetian merchants from the Levantine trade, and 
favouring Venetian merchants and ships in the western trade. This 
Manifatture e commerci nel Vicentino 1570–1700, Mailand 2004; A 
C, Nastri, nastrini, cordelle. L’industria serica nel Padovano, secc. XVII–XIX, 
Padua 2004.
23 W P, L’arte matrice. I laniﬁci nella Repubblica di Venezia nei 
secoli XVII e XVIII, Treviso 1996.
24 G G, I patrizi veneziani e la mercatura negli ultimi tre secoli 
della Repubblica, in: Mercanti e vita economica nella Repubblica veneta (secoli 
XIII–XVIII), ed. by G B, Verona 1985, pp. 403–451.
25 W B, G D, Marchands ﬂamands à Venise, vol. II, 
Brüssel / Rom 1986; B A, Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the 
Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean, Leiden 1995; M  G, Trading 
Places: The Netherlandish Merchants in Early Modern Venice, Leiden / Boston 2009; 
F R, La nazione portoghese. Ebrei ponentini e nuovi cristiani a Venezia, 
Turin 2007. 
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formal protectionism was conﬁrmed during the early years of the 
seventeenth century. Paolo Santorini – a Venetian jurist – proposed 
the opening of the Venetian port to foreign ships in order to expand 
its trade volume. Aer lengthy discussions between the diﬀerent 
magistracies and within the Senate, the proposal was rejected.26
 The volume of trade between 1570 and 1610 was constantly 
growing and despite the troubles of the period 1620–1640, the 
Venetian port never lost its importance in the intermediation of 
goods, whereas during the eighteenth century it was focused more on 
northern Europe and on the interregional market. But the growth in 
the late sixteenth century was remarkable if we consider on the one 
hand the withdrawal of the Venetian patricians from maritime trade, 
and, on the other, the growing role of foreign communities in the Ve-
netian economy. How was it possible for Venetian trade to combine 
its traditional protectionism with openness to foreign merchants? 
What was the consequence for the broader Venetian economy?
As we have seen in the ﬁrst section of this chapter, the Venetian 
trade was organized as a complex system of tax exemptions, excep-
tions and privileges. We will now analyze those privileges connected 
to international trade in order to understand their role with respect to 
the Venetian market policy. The institutional framework of privileges 
included both individual and collective privileges granted to mer-
chants and/or to single goods or market areas.
The ﬁrst – and main – commercial privilege that was granted to 
foreign merchants (including those coming from outside the city, i. e. 
from the Mainland) was the »privileged citizenship«.27 This citizen-
ship was divided in de intus and de intus et extra. The ﬁrst was granted 
to people who had lived in the city for 15 years, paying the necessary 
taxes and allowed them to trade within Venice using the same faci-
lities as the Venetian merchants. Instead, the citizenship de intus et 
extra was granted only aer 25 years of residence, and allowed the use 
26 G C, Il doge Nicolò Contarini. Ricerche sul patriziato veneziano 
agli inizi del Seicento, Venedig / Rom 1958, pp. 139–140; S, Commerci e 
industrie (n. 15), pp. 38–39;  G, Trading Places (n. 25), pp. 149–151.
27 M, Immigrazione (n. 10); B, Identité (n. 10); see also 
I C and L P, Merchants and institutions in early 
modern Venice, in: Journal of European Economic History 41,2 (2012), pp. 89–114.
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of the same tax exemptions as the Venetian merchants, especially to 
trade with the Levantine ports. However, they were bound to deﬁne 
themselves as »Venetian« in those ports.
Between the sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, there 
were many foreign merchants amongst the »new« citizens. Some-
times the merchants did not have the necessary requirements for 
citizenship, but the Venetian authorities granted it nonetheless. Two 
reasons lay behind this choice: the ﬁrst concerns their »usefulness« 
for the Venetian economy; the second, the fact that the merchants 
were active in some commercial networks of strategic importance for 
Venice.
Two interesting cases allow a better understanding of these points. 
The ﬁrst case refers to some Genoese merchants; the second, to the 
Melchiorri family, who came from the Mainland and were granted 
citizenship in 1590 and 1610.
Pasquale Spinola was a Genoese merchant involved in a wide 
range of commercial activities, but especially in the wool, coral and 
grain trade between Spain, Sicily and Venice. In 1583 Pasquale asked 
for citizenship, but he did not possess the necessary requirements. He 
had lived in Venice for only 23 years and he had not paid all the local 
taxes. However, his request was accepted because on the one hand he 
was »an honourable nobleman merchant that has great trade in this 
city with great beneﬁt for our duties«; on the other, during a time of 
economic crisis he was able to manage and organize a Florentine 
galleon which imported grain from Sicily, supplying the Serenissima. 
The Senate then recognized the role of Pasquale Spinola for the 
Venetian economy and in the following years Pasquale himself 
started a constant trade of wine and coral from Dalmatia and the 
Venetian Stato da Mar to Venice and the European markets. Like 
Pasquale Spinola, Simone Chiavari also asked for citizenship de intus
without the necessary requirements. However, the Cinque Savi alla 
Mercanzia recognized that he had imported a large amount of 
Spanish wool, which had made an important contribution to local 
custom duties, but – especially – to local manufacturers. Finally, 
Francesco and Ambrogio Marini asked to became citizens de intus, 
emphasising the »great trade that their family always did in Venice« 
for 70 years and how they would enlarge their business thanks to the 
privilege granted by the Republic. The Venetian Cinque Savi alla 
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Mercanzia were favourable especially because Francesco and Ambro-
gio Marini were »honoured merchants amongst the main merchants 
of the city, having great trade with great beneﬁt to the Venetian 
duties«. The Venetian Senate recognized Simone Chiavari, and Fran-
cesco and Ambrogio Marini as citizens and they started further 
complex trading activities between the Eastern Mediterranean, the 
North Sea and the Atlantic.28
 Merchants from the Venetian Mainland, who were active in long-
distance trade, obtained citizenship. The best example is that of the 
Melchiorri family, who were originally from Conegliano, a small city 
near Treviso. In 1582 Giacomo Melchiorri was granted the citizenship 
de intus without having the necessary requirements, because his trade 
made an important contribution to custom duties. The Melchiorri 
partnership was indeed particularly active in the »Ponentine« trade, 
where the Venetians suﬀered the competition especially in the port of 
the city of Lisbon. In the following years Giacomo started an inten-
sive trade in the Levantine routes, with imports from and export to 
the Indian markets, thanks to the Venetian agent Alessandro Studen-
toli.29 More than 20 years later, in 1612, Giacomo’s nephew Giulio, 
obtained the same privilege of citizen »because of the trade that the 
Melchiorri partnership carried out in Lisbon, India and the Levant«. 
In both cases, Venetian citizenship was granted to merchants that 
were able to open new markets and they made new connections 
where the Venetian presence was numerically inferior or less com-
petitive.30 It is necessary to recognize how this type of privilege, 
which was very closely linked to commercial activities, was also 
granted to many other foreign merchants, such as the Florentine, 
Milanese, and Dutch merchants.31
28 Archivio di Stato di Venezia (henceforth ASV), Cinque savi alla mercan-
zia, b. 138, I serie, c. 108r, 22 March 1590, c. 124v, 20 August 1590. See also 
B, Stratiﬁcazione (n. 10); , Ars mechanica e gerarchie sociali a 
Venezia tra XVI e XVII secolo, in: Le technicien dans la cité en Europe occidentale 
(1250–1650), ed. by M A and P M, Rom 2004, 
pp. 161–179.
29 ASV, Cinque savi alla mercanzia, b. 137, I serie, c. 77r, 24 January 1582.
30 ASV, Cinque savi alla mercanzia, b. 143, I serie, c. 159r, 20 August 1613.
31 See B, Identité (n. 10); R, Nazione portoghese (n. 25), 
pp. 72–73;  G, Trading Places (n. 25), pp. 132–139. 
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 In addition to the individual privileges, which were accorded to 
non-Venetian merchants through »citizenship«, there was another 
type of commercial privilege which was represented by the collective 
privileges, i. e. those accorded to entire foreign trading »commun-
ities«. One interesting case is the case of the Flemish merchants who 
had been exempted for the import of Spanish wool in Venice since 
1598. This privilege was renewed at least until 1623 in order to sustain 
the wool industry, which suﬀered from a lack of raw material.32 In 
1614, they also obtained the privilege to export raw silk from Venice 
to northern Europe, exploiting the overland trade and this privilege 
was renewed until 1640.33
 The commercial privileges also included single products and/or 
single market areas. Venetian economic policy generally restricted to 
»Venetian« ships the privilege to import and export through Venice 
and the other ports. With this policy, foreign merchants used other 
Italian ports (such as Leghorn or Ancona) in their trade with the 
Eastern Mediterranean ports. However, in the late sixteenth century, 
private shipbuilding in Venice went through a period of crisis and the 
Venetian Senate started a policy of »openness« to foreign ships. Some 
foreign ships obtained special privileges to be considered as »Vene-
tian«, with a conspicuous reduction in fees and taxes. Given the 
»diﬃcult situation in the shipbuilding sector« – as the Senate literally 
recorded – many exceptions were accorded to ships that did not have 
the necessary requirements.34
 However, the Senate also tried to overcome matters in the 
commercial privileges over a single range of products, as we have 
seen in the case of wool. Moreover, between the end of the sixteenth 
century and the early years of the seventeenth century, the Dutch 
merchant Marco Manart was granted the privilege to import salted 
ﬁsh and salumi, whilst the Dutch merchants Francesco Vrins and 
Giacomo van Lemens were guaranteed the import of Russian hemp 
for the Arsenale.35
32 On this point see ASV, Cinque savi alla mercanzia, I serie, b. 143, c. 162v, 
31 August 1613, b. 146, c. 17v, 4 May 1623.
33 See  G, Trading Places (n. 25), pp. 151–152. 
34 See, for instance, ASV, Cinque savi alla mercanzia, b. 139, c. 5v, 30 April 
1593; see also ASV Senato Mar. reg. 42, cc. 7r, 84r, 86r, 98r, 159r.
35 See  G, Trading Places (n. 25), pp. 72–73.
A political economy? 383
 When they accorded these privileges, the Cinque Savi alla 
Mercanzia in particular were careful that those grants did not limit 
competition among merchants; rather, they focused on the »useful-
ness« of these products for local manufacturers, who sometimes 
combined together in their production diﬀerent »privileged« 
imported products. Following a clear mercantilist policy, the case 
of the wool – and later, of the silk – sector is exemplary. In order to 
sustain domestic production, during the ﬁrst years of the seventeenth 
century, the Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia expressed a positive opinion in 
granting merchants privileges for the distribution of ash and alum, as 
well as wool. The privileges were normally limited to a period of 
10–25 years.36
 What was the impact of these privileges for the Venetian economy, 
and especially for international trade? It is hard to give a deﬁnite 
answer on this point. Further research, also from a quantitative point 
of view, seems to be necessary; however, it is possible to advance some 
preliminary considerations. Given the troubles of the local merchant 
class in Levantine trade, especially in the ﬁrst part of seventeenth 
century, an important role was played by the commercial privileges 
granted to foreign and local merchants. In various ways, commercial 
privileges were used to overcome the traditional protectionism and 
restrictions to Venetian trade; they were also used to enlarge markets 
and allow business cooperation, especially among Italian merchants. 
Finally, an important role of commercial privileges was in connection 
with the local manufacturing: that is, the commercial privileges were 
the ﬁrst stage in the development of new manufacturing activities, as 
the following section will show. However, at the same time the 
persistence of the privileges reinforced the control of the State over 
the market, inﬂuencing the commercial trends, allowing some 
groups to enter, but excluding others from the proﬁts of trade. 
Although there was »openness« to some groups, merchants or 
products, it is undeniable that privileges took a long time to be 
granted, speciﬁc requirements were asked, entry in the market was 
always limited and restricted under the control of the Senate and its 
powerful patrician members. Though a nuanced vision of privileges 
36 See ASV, Cinque savi alla mercanzia, I serie, b. 139, c. 25v, 23 September 
1598; b. 143, c. 81v, 31 March 1612.
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seems necessary to reconsider »Venetian« mercantilism, and mercan-
tilism as such, the strong limits imposed by the Senate on a market-
intended policy should not be forgotten.
III. Industrial privileges in the Venetian Republic
 This last section oﬀers some general considerations on the complex 
and evolving conﬁguration of the institutional framework regulating 
industrial activities in the Venetian Republic from 1500 to 1800, de-
rived from a detailed inquiry of some ceramics manufacturing enter-
prises.37 The ceramics industry was chosen as a test case as it involved 
highly technical skills and had experienced an early shi from cra-
guild production to the factory system, which was favoured by the 
granting of manufacturing privileges to private entrepreneurs.
Cra guilds, merchant entrepreneurs, privileged manufacturers 
and industrial entrepreneurs organized production in diﬀerent forms 
in a context that was strongly conditioned by formal and informal 
rules. The shi from one form of production to another was pa-
ralleled by a change in regulation, but had diﬀerent timing in various 
industries, depending on the strategic nature of their products for 
military power of the State and for the balance of payments, on their 
competitiveness and success in the international and domestic mar-
kets and on the connections with and interference from other ac-
tivities, from agriculture to urban health, safety and aesthetics.
What considerations can be drawn from an industry study to 
develop an interpretive framework to be used as a starting point for a 
more general inquiry into Venetian industrial policy?
Even if some continuity could be seen in the logic of industrial 
regulation, an exploratory division into periods emphasizes the dis-
continuities related: to the extension of mercantilist logic from com-
merce to production aer the sixteenth century; to the weakening 
ability to enforce guild and ﬁscal rules in the seventeenth century, 
with the multiplication of ad hoc exceptions and privileges; and to 
37 G F, Old and New Ceramics: Manufacturers, Products and 
Markets in the Venetian Republic in the 17th and 18th Centuries, in: L, At 
the Centre of the Old World (n. 7), pp. 271–315; G F, Privilegi 
d’industria e diritti di proprietà nelle manifatture di ceramica della Repubblica 
di Venezia (XVII–XVIII secolo), in: Quaderni Storici XLVI (2011), pp. 185–220. 
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the changing features of these privileges during the eighteenth 
century, with a gradual shi from monopoly to tax and customs 
exemptions as a tool to regulate industrial supply.
In a tentative generalisation, it could be said that the structure of 
the markets for factors involved in industrial production emerged as 
the result of a series of experiments in the construction of rules and 
incentive mechanisms, designed in an attempt to reconcile the inte-
rests of the State (and of its ruling elites) and the changing attitudes 
and nature of producers. In this context, rent-seeking activities and 
ﬁscal purposes are only some of the elements in the complex evolu-
tionary pattern of Venetian industrial mercantilism, together with a 
concept of equity based on hierarchy and status, and with a privileged 
focus on social and political stability implying an explicit aversion to-
ward innovation when it entailed processes of creative destruction.38
A crucial issue for the historian is the dynamic interaction between 
the diﬀerent values and preferences of the actors that frame their 
perception of rules, stakes and conﬂicts. Using this analytical ap-
proach, we will show here what emerges from an inquiry into the 
speciﬁc evolution of direct and indirect rules applied to the transfers 
of items and raw materials, to the use of means of production, and to 
the mobility of the labour force in a speciﬁc industry.
Access to the domestic market in the Republic of Venice was 
hampered by a number of barriers and local duties, introduced 
during the ﬁeenth and sixteenth centuries in order to attract trade 
ﬂows to the port of Venice and to increase the tax revenue of the 
State. Exemptions had been granted, however, since the ﬁeenth 
century to mainland cities and communities, and immunities were 
allowed to foreign citizens and to individual merchants. The very 
nature of these privileges was ambiguous, hovering between the 
recognition of a virtual autonomy that the State had no power to 
question, and the delegation of speciﬁc powers and functions by the 
State itself with the creation of exceptions to general rules.39
38 For the debate about mercantilism, see E and T, Mercantil-
ism (n. 4); , Politicized Economies (n. 4); J-L R, The 
Political Economy of Absolutism Reconsidered, in: Analytic Narratives, ed. by 
R H. B, A G, M L, J-L R and 
B W, Princeton (NJ.) 1998, pp. 64–108.
39 On this issue, see the ﬁrst section, and P L, I mercati della 
Repubblica veneta: economie cittadine e stato territoriale (secoli XV–XVIII), Venedig 
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The case study of the ceramics industry shows one of many similar 
successions of events that also in other sectors ﬁnally led the Venetian 
authorities to shi from granting exclusive monopolies to those 
manufacturers who could substitute imports to a preference for 
other forms of incentive, ﬁrst and foremost tax exemptions.
The ﬁrst industrial privileges granted since the seventeenth cen-
tury to private manufacturers, outside the guild framework, were 
indeed monopolies on the access to market, namely the exclusive 
right to sell a speciﬁc type of good within the boundaries of the 
Republic. In the eighteenth century, however, the inability of some 
monopolists to face the competition of imported goods became 
evident in many industries.40
At the beginning of the third decade of the eighteenth century, the 
Venetian production of ﬁne ceramics appeared in fact inadequate to 
face the challenge not only from Dutch majolica, but also from Asian 
porcelain, which had recently been imitated in Europe by Saxon and 
Viennese china. This situation drove the political authorities to issue a 
proclamation in 1728 granting tax exemptions to any manufacturer 
who applied for them and showed his ability to start production of 
ﬁne pottery and porcelain, as well as improving the production of 
majolica. The Venetian authorities chose then to stimulate import-
substituting initiatives by granting immunity from internal duties 
rather than monopoly rights to the producers, in order to encourage 
a wider dissemination of technical knowledge and its updating in an 
industry in which innovation was very fast. As explicitly argued in 
some judgements of the Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, only competition 
1999, pp. 86–120. We apply here the distinctions between rights (implying 
others’ duties) and privileges (exemptions from existing duties), and between the 
power to modify existing rights and the immunity from this power, as proposed 
by W N H, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in: Yale Law Journal 23,1 (1913), pp. 16–59, 
and applied to the historical study of the evolution of property rights by J 
G, Theories of Property and Economic Development, in: The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History 24,4 (1996), pp. 639–669.
40 Apart from the case of ceramics, see the case of other activities located in 
Venice as described in W P, The Industries of Venice in the 17th 
and 18th Centuries, in: L, At the Centre of the Old World (n. 7), 
pp. 185–214. For the historical debate on the nature of monopolies, see also 
B, Between Mercantilism (n. 6).
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among diﬀerent manufacturers could in fact encourage a constant 
improvement in production techniques. In contrast, the granting of 
an exclusive monopoly, however temporary, would leave the fate of 
national industries at the mercy of the personal and family fortunes 
of the privileged manufacturers, who could transform their privilege 
into a rent.41
The abolition of the monopolies was, however, a slow process, 
hampered by the need for the Republic to oﬀer substantial incentives 
to those who were able to substitute imported goods. Still, the new 
approach adopted in granting industrial privileges implied at least 
the possibility to terminate their validity in advance, in cases where 
the beneﬁciary failed to produce the expected beneﬁts for the balance 
of trade and where there were other manufacturers asking for 
authorization to pursue the same activity.
The reaction of the Venetian authorities to the evolving situation 
of the ceramics industry shows that favouring competition as a sti-
mulus to improve production did not reﬂect at all the idea to grant 
unrestricted access to market for all possible producers. When, for 
instance, in 1781 the authorities decided to ban the setting-up of new 
china factories for ten years, an exclusive right was virtually granted 
not for the beneﬁt of a single monopolist, but to all (the three) exis-
ting manufacturers.42
Since 1762 monopolies for the entire State were no longer granted 
to single ceramics manufacturers, although some of them were able 
to obtain exclusive rights for a more limited territory. It should be 
stressed, however, that this kind of protection did not prevent the sale 
of similar products within the exclusive area, but only the establish-
ment of similar types of manufacturing. The explicit purpose of these 
measures was in fact to protect the manufacturers against direct 
imitation by potential competitors who might be able to »steal« the 
secrets of production because of their proximity to an existing fac-
tory: in fact, what mattered was control over the circulation of 
technical knowledge and not the access to markets. On the other 
41 See, for an example of this kind of statement, ASV, Cinque Savi alla 
Mercanzia (henceforth VSM), b. 463, Salmazzo, 15 May 1752.
42 On this case, the text of the Senate decision is particularly interesting: ASV, 
Senato Terra (henceforth ST), ﬁlza 2749.
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hand, transport costs could be favourable to the manufacturer who 
had exclusive territorial rights provided the range was wide enough: 
these kinds of exclusive rights enhanced the territorial fragmentation 
of the domestic market created by the presence of domestic duties.
The segmentation of markets was, however, not only a matter of 
territorial barriers: ﬁscal measures that exempted some items from 
the payment of domestic duties had the eﬀect of segmenting the 
market also in terms of product quality. In fact, a basic distinction 
emerged in the late seventeenth century between popular and ﬁne 
wares. The former, cheaper wares were by tradition produced locally, 
and were in any case subject to the payment of internal duties, which 
indeed prevented any possible advantage deriving from their pro-
duction on a larger scale. The latter were instead usually exempted 
from duties under the privileges granted to their manufacturers 
precisely because of their ability to substitute imported products.
One might wonder if that policy was really intended to build a 
uniﬁed domestic market in which single manufacturers could com-
pete with each other. The access to tax and customs exemptions was 
indeed limited to higher-quality manufactures and was subject to pri-
or approval by the Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia, who granted exemp-
tions only aer careful consideration of the quality of production and 
of the potential conﬂicts that could arise between diﬀerent producers.
An analysis of the arguments advanced in support of granting or 
refusing to grant these privileges also brings to light frequent 
references to the temporary nature of the individual privileges 
provided by traditional guild regulation, which evidently remained 
a model also for an industry where the guilds no longer played any 
role. The transition to non-exclusive privileges should then not be 
interpreted as the direct eﬀect of progressive ideas, although physio-
cratic texts were circulating among patricians during the second half 
of the eighteenth century. These ideas probably had some eﬀect since 
they found expression in the forms of traditional corporative dis-
course.43
43 See B, Guilds (n. 5). On the physiocratic debate in Venice, it is still 
interesting the reconstruction proposed by G T, Andrea Tron e la 
crisi dell’aristocrazia senatoria a Venezia, Udine 1980. 
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In this perspective, the competition between manufacturers could 
become a tool to foster the development of industrial activities, but 
had to be carefully regulated not only in order to maintain tax reve-
nues, but also to avoid any threat to the stability of social hierarchies. 
The very idea of a self-regulating market seemed to be beyond the 
conceptual horizon of the Venetian ruling class, who would consider 
it unworkable in the presence of structural inequalities in power and 
status.44 However, the gradual abolition of monopolies ultimately 
led to the emergence of the idea of a market in which all manufac-
turers could compete with each other, an idea that found full 
expression in the general reform of 1794 which abolished industrial 
privileges and domestic customs altogether.
The presence of monopolies, tax exemptions, local exclusive rights 
and other industrial privileges implied a clear distinction between the 
ownership of the means of production, and the actual possibility to 
use them to produce manufactured goods that could be sold only 
within the constraints imposed by a complex set of rules and excep-
tions. As seen above, the interplay of trade barriers and tax exemp-
tions created a strong diﬀerentiation among manufacturers depend-
ing both on their location and on their products.
In particular, a clear distinction existed between the manufactures 
of Venice and those in the Mainland (Stato da Terra). The latter were 
in fact at disadvantage if compared with the former because of the 
transport costs and duties that they were in any case bound to pay for 
raw materials imported through the port of Venice, and to send their 
ﬁnal products back to Venice, which was the main market for luxury 
and high-quality goods. On the other hand, in the Mainland access to 
local raw materials (clay for ceramics) and to water power was much 
easier.45 Institutional and geographical factors then heavily inﬂu-
enced the productive choices of manufacturers, in particular their 
decisions whether to buy the materials they needed on the market or 
to get the ownership of the means to produce them on their own.
In this perspective, the case of water mills could be used as a good 
example of the peculiar status of means of production in that context. 
44 G L, Aequitas vs. fairness: reciprocità e equità fra età moderna e 
età contemporanea, in: Rivista di Storia Economica 19,2 (2003), pp. 195–204.
45 See some claims from both parties in ASV, VSM, b. 455.
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The ownership of a mill did not mean at all that it could be used for 
every possible production: property rights on the mill as an object did 
not imply the right to exploit and use it at best, as monopolies or 
exclusive rights granted to other manufacturers could prevent this. 
This situation was further complicated by the need to obtain also the 
right to exploit water power, traditionally exercised either by noble 
landowners or ecclesiastical institutions. Manufacturers could in fact 
get the ownership of the mills only where new channels were dug or 
in new territories. In ancient urban centres, the manufacturers 
usually had to pay to use the mills, or had to rent them from the 
nobles. In any case, having direct access to the mills made it possible 
for manufacturers to save a lot of money as they did not have to 
purchase ground materials, as was the case for the ceramics manu-
facturers in Venice.
The situation of the manufacturers in Venice was even more 
problematic where the supply of raw materials was concerned. In 
fact, as the ability to extract and process raw materials was crucial for 
cost reduction, the logistics of supply and distribution (i. e. the 
management of the working capital) was equally important. In this 
matter, the function performed by the agents operating in Venice on 
behalf of the manufacturers of the Mainland was decisive: they 
allowed producers to minimize cash payments and current liabilities 
by oﬀsetting the expenses for the purchase of imported raw materials 
with the revenues from the items sold on their behalf in Venice. In 
this way also the river transport costs could be reduced by using the 
same full-loaded boat there and back. This explains the manufac-
turers’ eﬀorts to obtain permission to open one or more shops in 
Venice, the city being a favourite outlet not only because of the 
demand of its aristocracy for luxuries, but also because of the 
institutional constraints imposing the transit at Rialto to the goods 
imported by sea.
For the manufacturers in Venice it was impossible to apply the 
same oﬀsetting strategy to the supply of materials from the Mainland: 
contracts with suppliers had to be regularly settled in cash, as the ﬁnal 
products were sold for cash in the Mainland at fairs and by pedlars. 
Here is another element explaining the ﬁnancial diﬃculties of 
Venetian manufacturers, who usually asked the Venetian authorities 
for subsidies in compensation for their investments, sometimes 
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justifying this request with the impossibility to exploit the customs 
exemptions on imported materials, because of the need not to make 
their ingredients common knowledge.46
This last point gives a clear indication of the possible trade-oﬀ
between the public nature of the privileges granted by the State and 
the need to keep the techniques and materials in use conﬁdential. 
This need became all the more pressing as the Venetian authorities 
started rejecting any demand for monopoly rights, allowing only 
limited territorial privileges. In this situation, access to market and 
control over the means of production were no longer enough to 
achieve a stable position without the ability to obtain and protect 
technical knowledge.
As the grant of monopolies became rare, in the petitions asking for 
industrial privileges in the ceramics industry it became usual to ask 
for oﬃcial approval of the internal regulations on labour.47 The 
explicit purpose of those norms was primarily to prevent the mobility 
of the workforce, as the training costs borne by privileged manufac-
turers could end up by favouring their competitors.
The link established between labour discipline and the control 
over the circulation of technical knowledge, which in some indus-
tries was the main asset at stake, however, posed some problems. The 
discrepancy between the object and the purpose of the regulations 
made it impossible to sanction those manufacturers who eventually 
succeeded in imitating the products of their competitors by attracting 
their workers: in fact they could rightfully ask for the same privileges, 
which they were almost always granted.
By granting its oﬃcial approval to the regulations on labour, the 
state invested the manufacturers with a power of control over their 
workforce they had not exercised before. The imposition of an 
»internal and external« discipline undermined, at least in principle, 
the high mobility that free labour enjoyed in early-modern times.48
46 See for an example the petition in ASV, ST, ﬁlza 2418, Cozzi.
47 The ﬁrst labour regulation oﬃcially granted to a ceramics manufacturer is 
in ASV, VSM, Diversorum, b. 463, Antonibon, 8 April 1732. See in the same box 
the details of a trial started in the failed attempt to enforce these regulations in 
the 1760s.
48 On this point, see A C, Dentro la bottega: culture del lavoro in 
una città d’età moderna, Venedig 2008. 
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Perhaps it was precisely because these regulations contrasted with 
tradition, that their enforcement proved quite impervious where the 
parties had recourse to legal proceedings. Rather, they performed a 
dissuasive function, at least until the outcome of the few actions 
brought against the workers infringing them showed that it was in 
fact still possible for those who acquired precious skills to move from 
one factory to another in pursuit of higher wages or even to start to 
manufacture on their own.
In the ﬁnal decades of the eighteenth century, the attitude of the 
Venetian authorities became increasingly favourable to a multiplica-
tion of competing manufacturers: in renewing privileges granted in 
the ceramics industry, the clauses providing for exclusive territorial 
rights were abolished in most cases, except for new or peculiar ty-
pologies.
The use some ceramics manufacturers were able to make in this 
context of the lease contract as a tool to prevent possible imitators 
from using existing kilns is particularly interesting. By accepting the 
inclusion in the contract of clauses limiting the use of the kilns, their 
owners waived their right to start a manufacture or rent it to other 
entrepreneurs who were able to do so.49 The rent could then be 
interpreted as the price they were paid for this waiver. If signing the 
lease contract meant accepting its constraints, it is possible to under-
stand the paradox in which the owners themselves were sometimes 
members of the same partnership who rented the kilns: the actual 
purpose of the contract was indeed to inhibit competition.
If the lease contract was used as a tool to bind the means of 
production against the payment of a rent to the owner, the partner-
ship was instead the favourite means to prevent potential competitors 
from starting an independent activity, allowing them to get involved 
in the management of existing manufactures and oﬀering in ex-
change a share in the proﬁts. It performed the function of allowing 
the participation of the holders of entrepreneurial and technical 
skills, capital, or special relationships with the political authorities or 
the ruling elite.
49 For an example, see the documents from a private archive cited in: 
G E, P M and N S (ed.), La ceramica degli 
Antonibon, Mailand 1990, p. 34.
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Conclusion
In conclusion of this short overview of the formal and informal rules 
governing ceramics manufacturing production in early-modern Ven-
ice, it is worth drawing some general considerations.
The ﬁrst is that the very concept of innovation takes on a special 
meaning in the context described here, as it was in fact a tool to get 
access to the privileges granted by the mercantilist state to innovators. 
The competitive advantages deriving from the introduction of an 
innovation are therefore not immediately distinguishable from those 
deriving from the related privileges. On the other hand, the mercan-
tilist deﬁnition of innovator for the sake of privilege granting was 
generally limited to import-substitution or (rarely) to export-
intended »innovations«: it favoured the imitation of imported prod-
ucts rather than radical innovations, whose commercial success was 
not guaranteed.
Secondly, the privileges granted to innovators included rights and 
exemptions that protected them only indirectly from the emergence 
of competitors and imitators. In the traditional regime based on 
Roman law, no kind of formal intellectual property rights existed, 
since it was not possible to claim rights over ideas.50 In this situation, 
the manufacturers resorted to a variety of tools to prevent others from 
beneﬁting from the technical knowledge they had acquired and 
exploited, or to maintain a virtual, if not a legal monopoly on an 
originally »innovative« production.
It is therefore possible to interpret exclusive rights on the exploi-
tation of some techniques as »patents« only metaphorically.51 The 
best example is perhaps provided by labour regulations that indirectly 
aﬀected the circulation of technical skills, but the same monopolies 
50 The concept of property on discoveries (with temporary monopoly on 
their exploitation) was introduced in continental Europe with the French 
Revolution and in England during a conﬂict between the Parliament and the 
Crown on monopoly privileges, in a context very similar to the one studied in 
this paragraph: see Adam Mossoﬀ, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An 
Intellectual History, 1550–1800, in: Hastings Law Journal 52 (2001), 
pp. 1255–1322.
51 On this issue, an assessment of the debate was proposed by S R. 
E, Property Rights to Technical Knowledge in Premodern Europe, 
1300–1800, in: American Economic Review 94,2 (2004), pp. 382–387.
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granted to manufacturers concerned their exclusive access to the 
domestic market, and not the innovation in itself. Such an »indirect« 
regulation actually proved ineﬀective to block the circulation of 
technical knowledge.
But interpreting this situation as the simple result of the absence of 
appropriate institutions protecting intellectual property rights pre-
vents us from understanding the same logic of an institutional system 
that was radically diﬀerent from the modern one. The very absence of 
intellectual property makes of mercantilism a privileged laboratory to 
study the wide range of institutional solutions adopted in the attempt 
to resolve the trade-oﬀ between the need to reward and protect 
innovators, and to avoid the creation of rent positions blocking 
innovation.
This paradox was usually (and still is) solved by granting tempo-
rary rights to the exclusive exploitation of innovation. The case 
studied here, however, shows that where this solution proved not 
eﬀective, the public authority could opt for incentives other than 
monopoly granting. The very fact that the essential link between 
innovation and monopoly was explicitly put into question casts some 
doubts on the general interpretation of mercantilist policies as the 
creation of rent positions in order to increase tax revenues. Mercan-
tilism should rather be interpreted as a series of empirical measures 
adopted in order to promote a surplus in trade balance and ensure the 
sustainability of supply, in some cases by hampering market com-
petition and in other ones by encouraging it. In this oscillation it is, 
however, possible to observe a progressive shi towards a competi-
tion freely limited by means of private agreements. The increased use 
of lease and partnership contracts as a tool to bind competition 
without resorting to the State authority in the late eighteenth century 
makes evident a change that would ﬁnd full expression in the reform 
of 1794, which ﬁnally abolished all industrial privileges together with 
domestic duties.
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